是否建议将其100％委托给面包师？

除非您有无限的资金,否则不能阻止过度授权,因为不能阻止用户委派给您.

因此,您不必对此太在乎,也许只奖励那些最先贡献100％的代表,而不是奖励其他代表.这样,显然是他们寻找另一个代表的诱因.

Unless you have infinite funds, you cannot prevent from being over delegated, since you cannot prevent users from delegating to you.

So, you shouldn’t care too much about it, maybe only give rewards to the delegators that were the first to contribute to the 100%, and not reward the other ones. This way, it is a clear incentive for them to find another delegate.

从纯粹的理论角度来看,当您是能够达到其优先0烘烤权的100％目标的面包师时,就您的资本而言,最佳情况是将其全部作为保证金予以冻结,因为这意味着您所有的资金都在运转.在这种情况下,一旦解除某种联系,它将通过新的烘烤再次重新锁定,并且同时您将永远不会错过任何一次单块/背书烘烤.处于这种情况下意味着面包师在任何时候都被100％完全委派:有足够的代表指向您,因为您的资金可以吸收.这对于面包师和委派者都是最佳的情况.

实际上,面包师很少遇到这种情况,实际上,他们要么"下"委派,要么"下"委派.

• 如果授权不足:"面包师"的表现不理想,这意味着您可以接受更多的委派并获得更多的烘焙权,而不会影响您的成功率,那么您的个人投资回报率不是最佳的.另一方面,这种情况对于委托人来说是很好的,因为他们仍然可以平均获得100％的预期回报(放样水平,当然要减去面包师的费用),他们的个人总投资回报率是最佳的(假设您没有任何回报)当然会在烘烤时出现操作错误).

• 如果您被过度授权:对于代表而言,is是次优的,因为您的资本不足以支付该操作的所有烘焙权.面包师账户中得到的奖励少于支付给所有代表的预期金额.在这种情况下,面包师通常先付钱(他的个人投资回报率是最佳的),所以他收到了他的期望值,但是代表们收到的有效金额将取决于面包师的政策(优先付钱给第一位面包师?对所有人都一样吗?).因此,在这种情况下,面包师的奖励通常是由面包师的政策"覆盖"的,而不是委托人的奖励(委托人的总ROI不理想).

总而言之,鉴于委托人经常参加代表团,并且不监视面包师的日常工作状况并向该面包师支付费用,因此他们通常希望面包师进行此项监视工作并给予他们一份如果他们认为自己可能会在不久的将来被过度授权,以便为代表们留出适当的时间来寻找替代方案,请单挑.

例如,在主网开始时,按照协议,初始绑定需求被故意降低(从0％开始),并在整个周期中逐渐提高.这意味着许多面包师开始使用的债券实际需求量很小,这使他们可以抓住机会,接受比资本额度一旦达到长期水平(资本为512XTZ和64XTZ)更多的委托.每个背书).这就造成了许多面包师没有立即被过度授权,而是被转发过度授权的情况.

From a purely theoretical perspective, when you are a baker who is capable to reaching 100% target of its priority 0 baking rights, the optimal situation in terms of your capital is to have all of it blocked as security deposit because it means that all your capital is working. In such situation as soon as some bond is unlocked it would get relocked again by a new baking and at the same time you would never miss a single block/endorsement baking right. To be in this situation means that the baker is exactly 100% delegated at all times: there's just enough delegators pointing to you as your capital can absorb. It is the optimal situation for both the baker and the delegators.

In reality, bakers are rarely in this situation, in practice they are either "under"-delegated or "over"-delegated.

• If you are under-delegated: it is suboptimal for the "baker" this means that you could have accepted more delegations and received more baking rights without impacting your success rate, your personal ROI is suboptimal. On the other hand this situation is fine for delegators because they still receive 100% of their expected rewards on average for their level of staking (minus the baker's fee of course), their personal gross ROI is optimal (assuming you don't make any operational mistake while baking of course).

• If you are over-delegated: is is suboptimal for the delegators because your capital is not enough to cover for all the baking rights of the operation. There's less rewards coming in the bakers' account than the expected amount to pay all the delegators. In such situations the baker usually pays himself first (his personal ROI is optimal) so he received his expected value however the effective amount received by delegators will depend on the policy of the baker (pay those who came first in priority? Or distribute the loss equally to everyone?). So in this scenario the baker rewards are usually "covered" by the baker policy but not the delegator's rewards (the delegators gross ROI is suboptimal).

So all in all, given that delegators often enter into a delegation and do not monitor day to day situation of the baker's bond and pay a fee to that baker, they usually expect the baker to do this monitoring job and give them a heads-up if they believe they might get over-delegated in the near future in order to give appropriate time for delegators to find an alternative.

For example in the beginning of mainnet, as per the protocol the initial bond requirement was kept intentionally low (started from 0%) and gradually ratcheted up over the cycles. This means that many bakers have been to start their operation with quite small actual bond requirements which allowed them to ride the opportunity and accept much more delegations than their capital would allow once the bond requirement would achieve its long term level (512XTZ per block and 64XTZ per endorsement). This created a situation where a number of baker got not immediately over-delegated but forward-over-delegated.

过度授权的面包师将由于债券不足而错过烘焙/背书.根据您面包师的政策,每个人都可能在奖励方面被淡化,否则最后的代表将根本没有获得奖励.

保证金的要求确实有所不同,因此,如果面包师有一定的储备来应对这一问题,那就很好了.随着赌注的增加(例如,在循环供应中占赌注的百分比增加),债券的要求将开始下降,因为面包师对于相同股份获得的烘烤权更少.

Bakers who are over-delegated will miss bakes/endorsements due to insufficient bonds. Depending on your baker's policy, everyone may be diluted rewards-wise, or the last delegators will simply receive no rewards.

The bond requirements do vary, so it's good if bakers have some reserves to cope with this. As staking increases (e.g. the % of staking out of the circulating supply increases), bond requirements will start to drop as bakers receive less baking rights for the same stake.

当没有押金的令牌进入面包店时,这些特定的令牌是多余的.我说的是这样一个事实,那就是额外的障碍落在他们身上.因此,没有人会失去任何东西. 面包师也吃光了他以前的食物(块数).在他重新委派之前,他不应该烤掉多余的块. 所以谁来宠坏了一切,他将不会得到报酬.面包师和以前一样.

不用担心没有足够的存款.

when tokens that are not secured by a deposit come to the baker, these particular tokens are redundant. I'm talking about the fact that it is on them that extra blocks fall. thus no one loses anything. the baker also eats out what he has previously (the number of blocks). and the extra blocks he should not have baked., before he became redelegated. so who came and spoiled everything, he will not receive a reward. and the baker stayed the same as before.

It should not be very worried that there is not enough deposit.